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IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OP UTAH 
E. A. RUSSELL and MARTELL E. RUSSELL, ) 
Plaintiffs -
vs. 
PARK CITY UTAH CORPORATION. 
Defendants -
Respondents, ) 
i e u aj. •, / 




In accordance with Rule 76 (e) (1) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the Appellant respectfully petitions this Honorable Court 
for a rehearing, on the ground that the Court has misquoted, mis-
construed and omitted certain material facts in its written opinion 
filed in this proceeding on April 8, 1976, and has reached its 
decision by incorrectly applying the law, as relates to the sever-
ability of certain land purchase privileges contained in the March 
31, 1967 Lease and Purchase Agreement (Exhibit 11) constituting the 
subject matter of the original appeal herein. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Prom the lower court's judgment against Appellant which determined 
that the subject Lease and Purchase Agreement (Exhibit 11) had been 
cancelled, the Appellant took the within appeal to reverse said court 
below. The issues were generally divided between the lease forfeiture 
question and severability of the land purchase privileges from the 
leasehold. This Court rendered its decision under date of April 8, 
1976, affirming the lower court's judgment, with Justice Maughan's 
dissent holding that the remaining option was independent and sever-
able from the leasehold interest. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 31, 19673 Appellant's predecessor and the Respondents 
executed a "Lease and Purchase Agreement" (Exhibit 11). 
On or about May 2, 1967, Appellant's said predecessor mailed 
the sum of $2,000.00 to Respondents (Exhibit 18) as required by the 
"Addendum" (Exhibit 11, last page) to paragraph VI, page 4, of said 
Lease and Purchase Agreement. Said $2,000,00 was the prior consid-
eration for exercising all three land purchase privileges set forth 
in paragraphs IV and VII of said agreement. 
Having mailed said $2,000.00 consideration for the three land 
purchase privileges (Exhibit 11:-Page 3,.Par. IV, 35 acre option 
Page 4, Par. VII, first refusal Page 5, Par. VII, March 31, 1977 
option) to Respondents on May 2, 1967, five months later in October, 
1967, the first option was "exercised" whereby "an escrow ... [was] 
opened by Lessee" as recited on Page 3, Par. IV, of the agreement. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Said first property purchase being thus initiated in October 1967* 
there was $1,600.00 cash and a mortgage note for $8,520.00 delivered 
into escrow for the 35 acres, at that time. The May, 1967, $2,000. 
consideration was not credited upon any land purchase until said 
escrow was opened 5 months later. 
The initial rental check on the leasehold was not paid by 
Appellant's predecessor, but was remitted directly by said predecessor's 
sub-tenants after the aforementioned purchase escrow (Exhibits 13 and 
14) closed in November, 1967. Said November, 1967, rental payment was 
the first cash consideration paid upon the, leasehold. 
During the first half of 19715 a controversy ensued between Appel-
lant, successor to the lessee-land-purchaser interest under the agree-
ment, and the Respondents, whereby the latter sought to terminate both 
the leasehold and the land purchase privileges resulting in the litigat-
ion encompassed by the within appeal. 
Under date of July 1, 1971, Respondents entered into a Lease Agree-
ment With Option To Purchase with Appellant's sub-tenants (Exhibit 26), 
purportedly excluding Appellant's interest under its agreement (Exhibit 11). 
By its terms, said July 1, 1971, agreement granted to Appellant's 
said sub-tenants a right of first refusal together with a fixed option 
to purchase exactly the same land upon almost identical terms (Exhibit 
26, Par. 8-10) as was granted Appellant under the latter's prior agree-
ment herein (Exhibit 11). Whereas Appellant was to exercise its option 
on March 31, 1977, the sub-tenants were given until June 30, 1981, 
(Exhibit 26; Par. 1, 8 and 9)- However, no separate consideration for 
the land purchase was provided for in said July 1, 1971, agreement as 
was the case in Appellant's agreement (Exhibit 11; Page 4, Par. VI). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THIS COURTTS WRITTEN DECISION CONTAINS MATERIAL FACTUAL 
ERROR, THROUGH MISQUOTATION, MISCONSTRUING AND OMISSIONS OP SUBSTANCE. 
[A] RE: FIRST REFUSAL xRIGHT 
This Court quotes a provision, presumably from Exhibit 11, which 
does not exist, to wit: 
"Lessee from and after the 1st day of November, 1968, has 
the Irrevocable right to purchase all or a portion of the 
subject property not theretofore purchased by Lessee from 
Lessors ... said right of purchase to remain in existence 
during the entire term of the lease [All emphasis herein 
added]fT. 
Utah Supreme Court decision, No. 14124, Page 3 
(See Appendix A to this brief) 
Reference to said Exhibit 11, the Lease and Purchase Agreement of 
March 31> 1967, Page 5, near top of page, (See Appendix B to this 
brief) discloses that one-half of this Court's aforesaid quotation 
was crossed out, including most of the Courtfs emphasized portion, 
and words were added thereto by Respondents all of which embodied an 
entirely separate, distinct "option" having nothing whatever to do 
with the first refusal right set forth on the previous page of said 
Exhibit 11. 
Predicated on the foregoing erroneous quotation, the Court mis-
construes the very nature of Appellant's position by this crucial 
observation: 
"The parties are in sharp disagreement as to the meaning 
of the just quoted language of the lease, particularly the 
emphasized portion. Defendants position is that the cove-
nant that the right of purchase shall exist 'during the 
entire term of the leaseT is a severable covenant 
Whereas, plaintiff contend to the contrary and that it was 
intended as an integral part of the total composite of the 
lease;" (Emphasis added) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Utah Supreme Court decision3 No. 14124, Page 3 
(See Appendix A hereto) ~ — 
Appellant respectfully represents that the Court's conclusion 
just quoted is entirely in error, in that: 1) the parties are in no 
disagreement as to the meaning of the "emphasized portion", or that 
it was excised from the agreement, or that the handwritten words added 
at the instance of Respondents refer to an "option" not to the right 
of first refusal described on Page 4, Par. VII. of the subject agreement; 
2) the Defendant-Appellant has not taken a position regarding any right 
based upon a covenant which states "during the entire term of the lease", 
since no such covenant remains in the agreement; 3) the Plaintiffs-
Respondents have never contended "that it was intended as an integral 
part" of the agreement, in view of the foregoing. 
Further to the above analysis, the Court mistakenly recited the 
time limits of the said first refusal right as: 
"....which granted to the defendant the first right of 
refusal to purchase any part of the land during the 
yentire term1 of the lease." (Emphasis added) 
Utah Supreme Court decision, No. 14124, Page 2, botton. 
(See Appendix A hereto) "" 
Reference to Exhibit 11, covering that part of the agreement deal-
ing with the time limits of said first refusal right, reveals this 
provision: 
"From and after the 1st day of November, 1968, Lessors 
shall have the right to sell the entire leased premises, 
less any portion theretofore purchased by Lessee from 
Lessors, to any bona fide third party. However Lessors 
shall extend to Lessee the first and prior right of such 
land purchase at the same price and upon the same terms 
offered to Lessors by said bona fide third-party or at 
the land's appraised value ..." (Bnpbasis added) 
March 315 19673 Lease and Purchase Agreement, Page 4, Par. VII 
(Exhibit 11) 
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Nowhere in the foregoing is the first refusal right restricted 
to: "during the entire term of the lease" (Utah Sup. Ct. Decision 
herein, Page 2, supra.). 
On the contrary, said provision (Exhibit 11, Page 4, supra) 
gives an absolute right to purchase "from and after the 1st day of 
November, 1968" and ceases to be operative only when the Respondents 
obtain a "bona fide third-party" offer to buy, whereupon said provision 
will terminate either by Appellant's purchase on the terms specified 
• * 
or by declining such right. 
[B] RE: THE MARCH 31, 1977 OPTION ./ 
It is apparent from the analysis hereinbefore set forth under 
the First Refusal Right portion hereof (POINT I - A, supra) that this 
Honorable Court overlooked the fact that the subject agreement contained 
a third purchase privilege in the form of an "option" (Appendix B, 
second paragraph) to be exercised on March 31* 1977* when the lease 
had ended. Thus, there were two options and a right of first refusal 
constituting a total of three purchase privileges paid for by Appel-
lant when they remitted their $2,000.00 cash consideration on May 
2, 1967 (Exhibit 18) in accordance with Page 4, Paragraph VI, and the 
"Addendum", in the agreement (Exhibit 11). 
Said oversight by the Court no doubt explains why they keep re-
ferring to just one "option" instead of considering both options. No-
where in this Court's opinion is the March 313 1977, option referred 
to as such and the entire decision gives the jupression that there 
were merely two purchase privileges, namely the 35 acre option and the 
first refusal right. In any case, Appellant is compelled to respect-
fully draw this Court's attention to certain erroneous implications 
and express recitals relating to this issue. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
For the Court's opening statement on this subject, the decision 
contains references to "the option", involving only the 35 acres. Of 
particular significance in said opening there appears: 
"Paragraph VI of the lease provided that the lessees 
(defendants) would deposit $2,000.00 with plaintiffs 
as consideration for the option, in addition to all 
other covenants in the lease ... The defendant exercised 
the option as to part of the land in May, 1967." 
(Emphasis added) 
Utah Supreme Court Decision, No. 14124, Page 1, Fifth Paragraph 
(See Appendix A) 
Notice that the underlined portions of the CourtsT above quoted 
statement are inconsistent with what the agreement actually says here: 
"As a further consideration for the above option [referring to 
Paragraph IV and the 35 acres only], and other privileges to 
purchase hereinafter recited [referring to the first refusal 
right, and the March 31> 1977\ option on Page 5 of the agreement], 
and in addition to the other covenants and conditions contained 
in this Agreement, Lessee agrees and herewith deposits with 
Lessors the sum of $1,000.00 cash ["Addendum" attached to agree-
ment raised amount to $2,000.00, to be paid by May 5, 1967]." 
(Qnphasis added) 
Lease and Purchase Agreement, Page 4, Par. VI (Exhibit 11) 
Said provision just quoted does not state the cash deposit 
"exercised" any purchase privilege, 35 acre option or otherwise, but 
merely describes what the consideration shall be for all three land 
purchase privileges, not just the 35 acre option. 
Also relating to this Court's aforementioned quoted recitation 
(supra) appearing on the first page of the decision, where it states: 
"The defendant exercised the option as to part of the land in May, 1967", 
it must be pointed out that said 35 acre option was "exercised" in 
October, 1967, (Exhibit 13) by opening an escrow and remitting $1,600.00 
cash with the execution of a mortgage note for $8,520.00, in accordance 
with this requirement: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"This option to purchase shall be exercised by Lessee 
on or before the 15th day of November, whereupon an 
escrow shall be opened." (Emphasis added) 
Lease and Purchase Agreement, Page 3, Par. IV (Exhibit II) 
In support of Appellant's said position, Words & Phrases, West 
Publishing Company, 1970 Edition, Volumes 15A and 45 respectively, 
define certain of the above key terms in this fashion: 
"The TexerciseT of an option to purchase is merely the 
election of the optionee to purchase. (Emphasis added) 
Floyd v. Morgan, 4 S.E. 2d 91, 97" 
f
'Whereupon is defined as immediately after. 
In re Premises 230 South, etc., 177 A. 700, 703, 
117 Pa. Super. 132" (Emphasis added) 
Thus, on May 2, 1967, (Exhibit 18) the consideration for all 
three purchase privileges (35 acre option on Page 3 •••• First Refusal 
Right on Page 4 March 31, 1977, Option on Page 5) was sent to Re-
spondents under the agreement (Exhibit 11, Page 4, Par. VI) and the first 
such privilege was not "exercised11 by opening escrow until five months 
later in October of 1967 (Exhibit 13), with the said escrow closing just 
before the required November 15, 1967, deadline (Exhibit 14). Further, 
about the time said escrow closed, the very first rental payment on 
the leasehold was tendered in November, 1967, (Exhibit 1) being wholly 
separate and distinct from the said land purchase consideration of 
$2,000.00 paid six months earlier (Exhibit 18). 
Had neither the 35 acre option been exercised by opening escrow 
or the first rental payment of $4,855-00 been paid by Ski Park West, 
there was no legal obligation for Respondents to return the $2,000.00 
land consideration and Respondents could have re-leased to others for 
any rent they wished, still subject to the remaining two purchase 
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privileges for which the $2,000.00 was paid (first refusal and March 
31, 1977 option). 
In any case, Respondents clearly derived a separate and additional 
benefit from the $2,000.00 paid in May, 1967, over and beyond any and 
all other consideration involved in the agreement, by virtue of the 
interest bearing value such sum possessed for six months, and the ad-
vantage to Respondents who could enjoy the use of said sum six months 
before the 35 acre option - escrow and the first leasehold rental 
would benefit Respondents in November of 1967. 
THEREFORE, our analysis of the subject IVkrch 31* 1977, option, 
found on Page 5, of the agreement (see Appendix B) has reached the 
point in this brief where Appellant must again review those matters 
previously encountered herein under POINT I-A, in order to fully evalu-
ate this Honorable Court's decision as it specifically relates to said 
March 31, 1977, option. 
The Court's reference, on Page 3 of the decision, to "Paragraph 
VI of the lease", is accurately quoted and clearly interpreted in that 
said $2,000.00 cash is "further consideration" for the 35 acre option, 
"and other privileges to purchase", thus implicitly including the first 
right of refusal (POINT I-A herein) and the subject March 31, 1977, 
option now under discussion. 
However, where the Court continues its opinion in this regard in 
an effort to connect the aforesaid Paragraph VI with the purported 
Paragraph VII quotation on said page 3 of the decision (Appendix A) 
and accurately relate the latter to any existing purchase right, such 
effort of course fails entirely. Said latter material quoted by the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Court does not reflect what is written in the agreement (Appendix B). 
Here is what the agreement does say, resulting from Respondents1 
action in changing the subject agreement by striking out portions 
thereof and adding words: 
"Lessee has the option to purchase all or a portion of the 
subject property not theretofore purchased by Lessee from 
Lessors at its appraised value and terms as immediately 
above set forth [referring to down payment, interest rate, 
installjnents, etc.] at the termination of the 10 year lease 
term, March 31* 1977» Lessees will notify Lessors in writ-
ing of their intention to exercise this option 30 days prior 
to termination of lease." (Emphasis added) 
March 31* 1967* Lease and Purchase Agreement, Page 5 
(See Appendix B) 
The last and concluding paragraph on Page 3 of the Courtfs 
decision employs a rationale which does not apply to the above-
mentioned option just stated. 
On the contrary, the crucial phrase quoted by the Court and used 
as a basis for attributing uncertainty to the agreement, namely: 
"during the entire term of lease", does not remain anywhere in the 
partiesf purchase provisions the same having been crossed out and 
other words added by Respondents. 
Said option appearing on Page 5 of the agreement is fall, com-
plete and framed simply. There are two parts: 1) the first sentence 
creates an absolute right to purchase on an exact date, March 31* 1977; 
2) the second sentence merely establishes that notice of the Lessee's 
intention to exercise be comnunicated in writing to Lessors 30 days 
prior to March 31* 1977. 
The very fact that Respondents crossed out "said right of purchase 
to remain in existence during the entire term of this lease", and then 
established a fixed date of March 31* 1977* can leave no doubt as to when 
the parties conterrplated a purchase of the remaining land would finally Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Respondents cannot now plead that they expected Appellant to 
exercise this option while the leasehold was in effect since by its 
very terms the Appellant was forced to wait until the lease had 
"terminated" and exercise said option on a date certain, March 31* 
1977* This is the right the $2,000.00 cash consideration paid for 
in May, 1967* pursuant to these clear, unequivocal words: 
"As a further consideration for the above option, and 
other privileges to purchase hereinafter recited, and 
in addition to the other covenants and conditions con-
tained in this Agreement, Lessee agrees and herewith 
deposits ..." (Emphasis added). 
March 31* 1967* Lease and Purchase Agreement, Page 4, Par. VI 
(Exhibit 11) '• 
Moreover, whatever other obligations were to be performed by 
Lessee in connection with the leasehold, such as paying rent, the 
clause underlined above: "and In addition to the other covenants 
and conditions contained in this Agreement" (Exhibit 11, Par. VI, 
supra) effectively, by itself, separated and severed the purchase 
privileges from the rest of the lease including said rent payments. 
POINT II: THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES STATED IN THE COURT'S DECISION HEREIN, 
TOGETHER WITH COLLATERAL LAW THERETO, SUPPORT APPELLANT'S PETITION. 
[A] RE: FORFEITURE; PARTIES' INTENT; ENFORCING TERMS. 
The within proceeding boils down to whether or not Appellant 
should be required to forfeit the remaining two land purchase privileges 
already paid for with the sum of $2,000.00 (POINT I, "A" and "B"). 
This Court proclaimed a basic guideline in its decision herein: 
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"It is true, as defendant argues, that forfeitures are not 
favored in the law, and that forfeiture provisions will be 
strictly construed against the one who seeks to enforce 
them. But it is also true that parties are free to con-
tract according to their desires ... that the contract 
should be enforced according to its terms ..." 
(Emphasis added) 
Utah Supreme Court Decision, Mo. 1^124, Page 2, Par. 4 
(See Appendix A hereto) 
Applying the three fundamentals, raised by the statement just 
quoted, to the land purchase privilege issue, it would be unconscion-
able to force forfeiture upon Appellant when the Respondents have 
clearly manifested their continuing desire to sell their land, as 
demonstrated by: Appellant's first refusal right which prevails 
"from and after the 1st day of November, 1968" (Exhibit 11, Page 4) 
unlimited as to duration; Appellants option which can only be exer-
cised on March 313 1977, (Exhibit 11, Page 5), a date clearly in the 
future; and, the fact Respondents have reaffirmed their desire to 
sell even in the purported option given to Appellant's subtenants, 
on essentially the same basis as given to Appellant, which provision 
runs to June 30, 1981 (Exhibit 26, Pages 1, 3)- Finally, since the 
expression "said right of purchase to remain in existence during the 
entire term of the lease" (Appendix A, Page 3 middle), is not part 
of the parties' agreement, thus removing the uncertainty mistakenly 
relied upon by the Court for its decision, now the terms of the re-
maining two purchase rights need nothing extraneous to make them 
operative and should be enforced. Further, by enforcing said remain-
ing two purchase privileges in favor of Appellant no prejudice whatever 
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can result to Respondents as they will merely obtain the benefits of 
a land sale originally intended by than on March 31, 1967 (Exhibit 11), 
which intention has never ceased as indicated by the aforesaid pur-
ported agreement with Appellant's subtenants (Exhibit 26, Page 3* 
Paragraphs 8 to 10) that runs to. June 30, 1981. 
Thus, wholly apart from all the other legal elements supporting 
Appellant's position herein, the equities also favor Appellant as 
embraced by these rules: 
"The presence of independent equities or grounds for 
relief from forfeiture may constitute a basis for en-
forcement of or other appropriate relief respecting 
such an option, although the lease in which it was 
contained and upon which it was dependent [Note: 
Nevertheless, Appellant's purchase rights are inde-
pendent of the terminated lease herein] has been 
terminated." 
115 ALR 376, 384 
"A construction which is just and fair to both parties 
will be preferred to one which is unjust or unfair 
[citing many cases]" (Emphasis added) 
17 Am. Jur 2d Contracts, P. 6k6 
[B.] RE: CONSIDERATION; SEVERABILITY 
This Court has clearly expressed the fundamental doctrine govern-
ing whether Appellant's remaining two purchase privileges survive: 
"In this instance, for the purpose of determining 
whether this right of refusal survived the terminat-
ion of the lease, we think the same rule applies as 
that which governs options contained in leases: 
that is, if by the express terms of the option, it 
can be seen as independent of the other covenants 
of the lease, and is supported by a valid consideration, 
it can continue in existence notwithstanding the : 
lease's; termination." 
Utah Supreme Court decision, No. 14124, Page 3 
(Appendix A hereto) ,*.: 
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In this connection it is implicit that the relevant provisions 
of the lease can be narrowed down to paragraphs VI and VII, concern-
ing both of the remaining two purchase privileges due Appellant 
(i.e. first refusal, Page 4; March 31, 1977, option, Page 5). 
This Court agrees with the foregoing and has identified the 
material part of said Paragraph VI that bears on the problem, as 
follows: 
"As a further consideration for the above option, and 
other privileges to purchase hereinafter recited, and 
in addition to the other covenants and conditions con-
tained in this agreement, Lessee agrees and herewith 
deposits with Lessors the sum of $2,000.00 cash ..." 
(Emphasis added) 
Utah Supreme Court decision, No. 14124, Page 3 
(Appendix A hereto) 
The full significance of said unequivocal statement just quoted, 
in creating severability of Appellant's remaining two purchase privileges 
on the basis of consideration alone, is demonstrated in these terms: 
"That is, if the consideration is single, the contract is 
entire, but if the consideration is expressly or by neces-
sary Implication apportioned, the contract is severable. 
Thus, where several things are to be done under a Contract, 
and the money consideration to be paid is apportioned to 
each of the items [i.e. $2,000.00 on options .... rent on 
leasehold], the contract is ordinarily regarded as sever-
able [citing many, many cases]." (Emphasis added) 
17 Am Jur 2d Contracts, Sect. 326 
Also supporting the view that the nature of the consideration alone 
is the primary test of severability, this Court in a Utah case (Thomas 
J. Peck & Sons, Inc. vs. Lee Rock Products, Inc., 515 P2d 448; Footnote 
2), involving the severability of an option from a leasehold, refers 
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the reader to the following authority: 
"Another test that has been suggested is the 
possibility or impossibility of a certain ap-
portionment of benefits, according to the com-
pensation in the contract, in case of part per-
formance only. The singleness or apportionability 
of the consideration appears, however, to be the 
principal test. If the consideration is single, 
the contract is entire; but if the consideration 
is expressly or by necessary implication apport-
ioned, the contract is severable. The question 
is ordinarily determined by inquiring whether the 
contract embraces one or more subject-matters, 
whether the obligation is due at the same time 
to the same person, and whether the consideration 
is entire or apportioned." (Emphasis added) 
Knapp v. Strauss, 58 S.W. (2d) 808 (middle of second column); 
LSaid case is quoting from 6 R.C..L. 858, Sect. 246] 
It should be observed that, beyond the consideration question, 
Appellant's options meet the other severability criteria just quoted: 
apportionment of benefits in case of part performance, more than one 
subject matter and different time frames for performance. 
Recalling again that the subject $2,000.00 cash consideration 
for all three purchase privileges (Exhibit 11, Page 3; Page 4; Page 5, 
respectively), was paid on May 2, 1967, (Exhibit 18), and that the 
first purchase privilege was not "exercised" until October, 1967 
(See analysis: POINT I-B herein), so that Respondents had the use 
of said money for six months, including its interest bearing value, 
before any further cash or other consideration was received by them, 
the following fundamental rule is relevant in ascertaining the suf-
ficiency of said payment: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"It is fundamental that adult persons suffering 
from no disabilities have complete freedom of 
contract, and ordinarily the courts will not 
inquire into the adequacy of the consideration 
for their contracts .... The general rule is 
that consideration is not insufficient merely 
because it is inadequate [citing much authority, 
Including: Williston, Contracts 3d ed. Sect. 115 
and the Restatement, Contracts, Sect. 81] .... 
Even a nominal consideration, such as $1.00 
will sustain a promise if it is the consideration 
in fact agreed upon. And while, to be sufficient, 
the consideration agreed upon must be a legal 
benefit or detriment, it need not be an actual 
pecuniary benefit or detriment." 
17 Am. Jur 2d.- Contracts Sect. 102 
[C] RE: CONSTRUCTION OP THE AGREEMENT 
Continuing with this Honorable Court's evaluation whereby it 
has narrowed down the relevant provisions of the lease to Paragraph 
VI (See analysis: POINT II-B, herein) and Paragraph VII, concerning 
Appellant's remaining two purchase privileges (i.e. first refusal, 
Page 4; March 31, 1977* option, Page 5)* the Court has, as heretofore 
shown (POINT I-A, herein), miquoted the second quotation appearing in 
its decision on Page 3 thereof relating to said Paragraph VII. 
Consquently, the right of first refusal which is contained only 
on Page 4 (Exhibit 11) is entirely misconstrued, and the March 315 
1977, option that is included only on Page 5 (Exhibit 11) is entirely 
omitted from this Court?s opinion. 
As a result, the concluding paragraph found on Page 3 of the 
decision (Appendix A hereto) is inappropriate. 
As previously indicated in this brief (POINT I, A and B) the 
language of the first refusal (Exhibit 11, Page 4 only) and the 
March 31, 1977, option (Exhibit 11, Page 5 only) is clear in both 
substance and detail. No further words are needed as to either 
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purchase privilege to make them fully functional, and they clearly 
are separate and distinct in subject matter, as well as time for 
performance, from the leasehold interest. 
Nowhere in the subject agreement is there this phrase: "during 
the entire term of the lease" pertaining to any of the purclnase privi-
leges, which was erroneously relied upon for the CourtTs decision of 
April 8, 1976. On the contrary, that phrase was specifically rejected 
when Respondents changed the agreement by crossing-out the same ! 
The language that does remain, as it involves the first refusal 
and March 31, 1977, option, must be read in light of these governing 
principles of construction: 
"The determination that an agreement is_ sufficiently 
definite is favored [Citing many, many cases]" 
17 Am, Jur 2d Contracts P. 4l4, Sect. 75 
"A construction which would render a contract 
provision of doubtful validity is to be avoided 
if another reasonable construction can be placed 
upon it," 
Newport News Shipbuilding etc. v. United States (CA 4) 
226 F2d 137 
"The court should interpret an instrument in cases 
of doubtful construction, ut res magis valeat, [so 
that the provision becomes operative rather than 
terminated]. 
Dundas v. Hitchcock, 12 How (U.S.) 256, 13 L.ed 978 
Supporting this principle: 
Schofield v. ZCMI, 85 Utah 281, 39 P2d 342 
Restatement, Contracts. Sect. 236 
"A contract, being construed, should be viewed 
prospectively as the parties viewed it at the 
time of its execution, and not from a retro-
spective point of view." 
45 ALR 2d 984 
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"Generally, words in a contract are to be given 
their usual and primary meaning at the time of 
the execution of the contract. The mere fact 
that at the time of suit the parties do not 
agree upon the proper construction of their 
unambiguous language does not make it 
ambiguous." 
17 Am. Jur 2d Contracts 639 
Holding that generally a contract or lease is ordinarily to 
be construed more strongly against the promisor or lessor (Respondents) 
in case of ambiguity, are these volumes containing appropriate references: 
51 ALR 628 
61 ALR 706 
148 ALR 580 
2 ALR 2d 1143 
20 ALR 2d 1320 
46 AIE 2d 832 
A provision in a lease giving the lessee an option to purchase 
after "expiration of the lease" was found not too indefinite, even 
though the price and terms were left to disinterested third parties, in 
circumstances less clear than Appellant's IV&rch 31, 1977, option herein, 
as indicated by this case: 
Bewick v. Mecham, 26 Cal. 2d 92, 156 P2d 757 
This Court has imparted considerable "certainty" to language in a 
lease giving an option to the lessee to purchase that requires said 
option to be performed "on a specified day", which is the situation 
with Appellant's lYkrch 31, 1977 option, as shown by: 
Tilton v. Sterling Coal & Coke Co. 28 Utah 173,77 P. 758 
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IVkny authorities consider It fundamental construction that 
leases with options therein are independent of each other and of 
a "dual nature", so that a breach of the lease has no effect on 
the option. Here are just a few of the cases with this view: 
Mathews Slate Co. v. New Empire Slate Co. (CC NY) 
122 F 927 
Larry v. Brown, 153 Ala, 452, 44 So. 841 
Larstan Industries, Inc. v. Res-Alia Holding Co., 
96 N.J. Super. 37, 232 A2d 440 
Where by practical construction the option provisions and the 
leasehold provisions "are not interdependent", and the consideration 
therefore is separate, (Appellant's situation)'this case cited by the 
Court in its decision herein (Appendix A, Page 3) holds the right to 
enforce the option is not dependent upon the subsistence of the lease: 
Prout v. Roby, 82 U.S. (15 Wall) 471 
Further to the case just cited, which this Court relies upon in 
its decision herein (Appendix A, Page 3), it is likewise pointed out 
that where the lessors' covenant to convey under the option is not 
limited to "the life of the lease", then such conveyance under the 
option may be demanded at the time for exercising said option and 
"the existence or nonexistence of the lease at the time the demand 
for a conveyance is made is immaterial to the rights of the parties.": 
Prout v. Roby (supra.) 
-1Q_ 
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[D.] RE: PAROL EVIDENCE RULE 
This Honorable Court has carefully consolidated its decision 
concerning the purchase privileges, into this final holding: 
"The parties are in sharp disagreement as to the 
meaning of the just quoted language of the lease, 
particularly the emphasized portion [i.e. 'said 
right of purchase to remain in existence during 
the entire term of the lease"7! ... In view ,of 
the lack of certainty in the language of the 
lease, the trial court was justified in admitting 
extraneous evidence as to what was intended ..." 
Utah Supreme Court decision, No. 14124, Page 3* last 
Paragraph (Appendix A hereto) 
Thus, the "lack of certainty in the language of the lease" 
comes down to the "emphasized portion", and on this basis "extraneous 
evidence" was justified in allowing the trial court to nullify Ap-
pellant's remaining purchase privileges. 
By this same reasoning the Appellant urges this Court to properly 
employ the converse approach and hold that since the "emphasized port-
ion" is nowhere part of the parties1 agreement and since it is not 
true that the parties are in "sharp disagreement as to the meaning" 
thereof in view of the said expression having been deleted from the 
agreement (Appendix B hereto), there is no justification for allowing 
the lower court to let in "extraneous evidence as to what was intended" 
contrary to the Parol Evidence Rule. 
All the necessary words and phrases are in writing and present in 
the provisions which, embrace Appellant's remaining two purchase privi-
leges (Exhibit 11, Par. VI; Par. VII), sufficient to operate without 
any "extraneous evidence", (POINT I, A and B. herein). 
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These fundamental legal concepts serve to bar the introduction 
of said extraneous evidence, under the present circumstances, as 
follows: 
"The general rule is that parol evidence is not ad-
missible to vary or contradict the terms of a 
written lease ... When a lease is reduced to writ-
ing, the law presumes that the writing contains 
the whole agreement ... under ordinary circumstances, 
extrinsic facts are not considered in the construction 
and interpretation of a written lease, which is complete 
in itself ..." (Emphasis added) 
49 Am.Jur 2d Landlord and Tenant, Section 145 
"The instrument itself is regarded as the best evidence 
of what the parties intended, and the writing still 
remains the best evidence of the understanding of the 
parties, even though, through a defect of form or by 
reason of some positive provision of law, it cannot 
have the effect intended for it ...[the rule] is de-
signed to permit a party to a written contract to 
protect himself against perjury, infirmity of memory, 
or death ..." (Emphasis added). 
30 Am.Jur 2d Evidence 152 
TfWhatever the law implies from a contract in writing 
[i.e. separate consideration equals severable option, 
etc.] is as much a part of the contract as that which 
is therein expressed; and if the contract, with what 
the law implies, is clear, definite, and complete, it 
cannot be added to, varied, or contradicted by ex-
trinsic evidence." 
30 Am. Jur 2d Evidence Sect. 1018 
"It has been held that since the parol evidence rule 
is one of substantive law, the admission, without 
objection, of such testimony does not preclude the 
trial court from disregarding it ... and that an ap-
pellate court cannot consider such evidence or give 
it any weight." (Emphasis added) 
30 Am. Jur 2d. Evidence. Sect. 1022 
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"The mere fact that there Is a dispute between the 
parties as to the interpretation of a document does 
not mean that there is an ambiguity justifying the 
admission of parol evidence for explanatory 
purposes." 
Midklff v. Castle & Cooke, Inc., 45 Hawaii 409, 368 P. 2d 887 
"Resort to extraneous facts is justified only if the 
contract itself creates a patent ambiguity." 
Greer v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. (CA10) 200 P. 2d 920 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, Appellant requests this Honorable Court to grant a 
rehearing as hereinbefore set forth and determine that Appellant's 
two remaining purchase privileges in the form of a right to first 
refusal (Exhibit 11, Page 4 only) and a March 31, 19773 option 
(Exhibit 11, Page 5 only), be held as independent, severable rights 
in favor of Appellant which survive the leasehold interest. 
To hold otherwise would be contrary not only to law but would 
fail to render substantial justice in this proceeding since Appellant 
has already suffered loss of the lease, the Respondents have in-
tended at all times through to 1981 (Exhibit 26) to sell their land 
on substantially the same basis as embraced by Appellant's purchase 
privileges, and the subtenants will still have a lease on these 
same premises for 99 years, under Appellant (Exhibit 20), even 
after Appellant owns said land notwithstanding Appellants 
termination of their lease with Respondents. 
That is, no party suffers a detriment where Appellant prevails 
herein, but the Appellant will alone suffer should this Court refuse 
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the relief requested In this petition and brief. 




CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE 
Served two copies of the foregoing Petition For Rehearing and 
brief, upon counsel for Respondents, by mailing the same to them at 
their address set forth on the cover hereof, postage prepaid, this 
2 <<l *" day of £UV/JJ£ 1976. 
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APPENDIX A, Page 1 . 
IN THE S U P R E M E COURT OF THE S T A T E OF UTAH 
.... 00O00 
No. 14124 
F I L E D 
April 8, 1976 
Park City Utah Corporation, et al. , 
Defendants and Appellant. Allan E. Mecham, Clerk 
CROCKETT, Justice: 
Plaintiffs Russel l sued to terminate all rights of defendant Park City 
Utah Corporation in a lease for nonpayment of rent. Plaintiffs' motion for 
summary judgment was granted, and defendant appealed. We remanded for 
trial. * From a judgment terminating both the lease and an option to purchase 
contained therein, defendant appeals, contending that there was no termina-
tion of the l ease , and that even if there was, the option to purchase did not 
fall with it. 
1
 Defendant13 predecessor obtained a ten-year lease with an option to 
purchase on March 31, 1967. On July 31, 1967, defendant's predecessor 
subleased the land, located in Summit and Salt Lake Counties, to Robert W. 
Ensign, who, within the next two or three months, assigned the lease to Ski 
Park City West, Inc. , herein called Park West, which has since been in 
possess ion . 
The lease covered some 1,987 acre3, and called for rental payments 
of $2. 50 per acre per year. Defendant was to develop the land as a ski r e - ', ... 
sort by clearing runs, installing lifts and other faci l i t ies . (Plaintiffs r e -
served the right to graze their sheep on the land every year between May 15 
and November 1.) The lease contained this provision, in Paragraph VIII,. 
as to forfeiture: . . . ._.. - ,..^ 
No default of Lessee in any of the provisions hereof 
shall constitute a basis for forfeiture of this lease unless 
the 3ame shall continue for more than forty-five (45) 
days after written notice to Les see specifying of what the 
default consists , and in the event Lessee fails to correct 
said default within such further time as is reasonably 
necessary to cure same, L e s s e e shall quit and surrender 
the premises to Lessor . . . . 
The option to buy provided that the l e s see (defendant) had the exclu-
sive option to buy 35 acres of property at $300 per acre, exercisable before 
November 15, 1967. After that date, the l e s sor had the right to sel l any 
part of the land, subject to the l e s s e e ' s right of first refusal at the same 
price any third party should offer. Paragraph VI of the lease provided that I 
the l e s s e e s (defendants) would deposit $2,000 with plaintiffs as considera- f 
tion for the option, in addition to all other covenants in the lease , and that, ? 
if the option was not exercised before November 15, 1967, the deposit would i 
be applied to the rental payments for 1967. The defendant exercised the op- J 
tion as to part of the land in May, 1967. . 
The annual rental payments were made for 1967, 1968 and 1969. 
Late in 1970 a dispute arose between defendant and its sublessee , Park West, 
as to money owed by the latter to defendant. The defendant instructed Park 
West to make payments directly to plaintiffs, but Park West refused. The " ~ 
defendant failed to make the rental payment on November 1, 1970, as required. 
1. Russel l v. Park City Utah Corporation, 29 Utah 2d 184, 506 P . 2d 1274(1973). 
E. A. Russel l and 
Martell E. Russel l , 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
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In February, 1971, the defendant again instructed Park West to make its pay-
ments to plaintiffs, and again Park West refused. On March 11, 1971, plaintiffs 
sent a letter to defendant stating that if the rent was not paid within 45 days, 
they would declare the lease terminated. In a letter dated March 29, 1971, 
plaintiffs' attorney reaffirmed the letter of March 11, and set April 26, 1971, 
(45 days from March 12) as the deadline for payment. The defendant did not 
meet that demand, but on June 7, 1971, tendered payment which the plaintiffs 
refused. 
It was on those facts that the trial court granted the plaintiffs' motion 
for summary judgment. We reversed because there were disputes concerning 
the defendant's receipt of the letter and other circumstances pertaining to the 
forfeiture. After remand and upon the trial, the court found the disputed issues 
in favor of the plaintifisand that the lease had been terminated in accordance 
with its t erms . 
Defendant now argues that the procedure followed by the plaintiffs, giv-
ing it only 45 days to remedy its default, was not in conformity with Paragraph 
VIII of the lease quoted above, which gives it the 45 days after written notice, 
plus "such further time as is reasonably necessary to cure" the default. Under 
the findings and determination made by the trial court we do not confront the 
question as posed by the defendant. The notice wa3 received on March 12, 1971, 
and the trial court found that the defendant made no attempt to pay the rent dur-
ing the 45-day grace period, or during the following six weeks until the tender 
of June 7, 1971. The problem here is not what plaintiffs would or should have 
done if the defendant had made the tender at some earlier time. We are of the 
opinion that there is a reasonable basis in the evidence for the trial court's 
finding that the tender was not made within a reasonable time and that the plain-
tiffs were justified in refusing the tender and terminating the lease . 
It is true, as defendant argues, that forfeitures are not favored.in the 
law, and that forfeiture provisions will be strictly construed against the one 
who seeks to enforce them. But it is also true that parties are free to con-
tract according to their des ires in whatever terms they can agree upon; and 
further, that the contract should be enforced according to its terms , unless 
that result is so unconscionable that a court of equity will refuse to enforce it. 
No such circumstances appears to exist here. 
The foregoing affirm«nc2 of the termination of the lea^e cut3 the foun-
dation out from under the defendant's argument that the plaintiffs had waived 
their right of forfeiture of the lease by accepting rent from defendant's sub-
l e s s e e , Park West. It is true that the latter had been the sublessee of the 
defendant and had been in possess ion of the property practically from the be-
ginning of the lease term. Nevertheless , after the lease was terminated as 
delineated above, the plaintiffs were free to rent the property to Park West or 
anyone e lse , as the trial court correctly ruled. 
The other aspect of this case relates to the options to purchase given 
to the l e s see (defendant). Paragraph VI of the lease provided: 
Lessors give and grant to Lessee the exclusive option 
to purchase thirty-five (35) acres of property. . . . 
This option to purchase shall be exercised by Lessee 
on or before the 15th Day of November, 1967. . . . 
The defendant did exercise this option as to part of the thirty-five acres before 
November 15* 1967. The problem of more critical concern here involved the 
provision, referred to above, which granted to the defendant the "first right of 
refusal" to purchase any part of the land during the "entire term" of the lease. 
We note awareness that what is often calied "the right of refusal" is not the 
2. Green v. Palfryman, 109 Utah 291, 166 P. 2d 215 (1946). 
3. Jacobson v. Swan, 3 Utah 2d 59, 278 P. 2d 294 (1954); Perkins v. Spencer, 
121 Utah 468, 243 P . 2d 446 (1952) and cases cited therein. 
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s a m e as an option, wherein the optionee has a definite right to pu rchase , 
w h e r e a s , the right of refusal has no effect until and unless the par ty g ran t -
ing it (plaintiffs here) decides to se l l . If he does so decide, then the right 
of refusal does become an option in that its p o s s e s s o r has the f irs t oppor-
tunity to pu rchase the p roper ty at the p r i ce at which the owner will sel l to 
anyone. ^ in this ins tance , for the purpose of determining whether this r ight 
of refusal survived the te rmina t ion of the l ea se , we think the same rule 
applies as that which governs options contained in l ea se s : that i s , if by the 
expres s t e r m s of the option, it can be seen as independent of the other cove-
nants of the l e a s e , and is supported by a valid considerat ion, it can continue 
in exis tence notwithstanding the l e a s e ' s t e r m i n a t i o n . 5 
There a r e two provis ions of the l ease which have a bear ing on the 
p rob lem. P a r a g r a p h VI of the l ease r e a d s : 
As a fur ther considera t ion for the above option, and 
other pr iv i leges to pu rchase here inaf te r rec i ted , and in 
addition to the other covenants and conditions contained in 
this ag reemen t , L e s s e e a g r e e s and herewith deposi ts 
with Le33ors the sum of $2 ,000.00 cash . . . . 
To be cons idered in connection with the foregoing is the provis ion of the next 
pa r ag raph , No. VII, which s t a t e s : 
..." L e s s e e from and after the 1st day of November , 1968, 
has the i r r evocab le right to pu rchase al l o r a port ion of the 
subject p rope r ty not there tofore purchased by L e s s e e from 
L e s s o r s . . . said right of pu rchase to remain in exis tence 
during the en t i re t e r m of the l e a s e . [All emphas is he re in 
added . j 
The pa r t i e s a r e in sha rp d i sagreement as to the meaning of the just 
quoted language of the l e a s e , pa r t i cu la r ly the emphas ised port ion. Defendant 's 
posi t ion is that the covenant that the right of pu rchase shal l exist "dur ing the 
ent i re t e r m of the l e a se" is a severab le covenant, supported by sepa ra t e con-
s idera t ion , and exis ts independently of the other provis ions of the l ease for 
the ent i re t e n - y e a r t e r m thereof. Whereas , plaintiff contend, to the con t r a ry 
and that it was intended as an in tegral pa r t of the total composi te of the l e a s e ; 
and when fhe l ea se was forfeited and t e rmina ted , this covenant fe.H with i t . 
In view of the lack of cer ta in ty in the language of the l e a s e , the t r i a l cour t was 
justified in admit t ing extraneous evidence as to what was intended. This was 
done and on disputed evidence, the court found in accordance with the p la in-
tiffs^ posi t ion as ju3t s ta ted. 
Affirmed. Co3ts to plaintiffs ( respondents) . 
WE CONCUR: 
F . Henr i Henriod, Chief Jus t ice 
A. H. El le t t , Jus t i ce 
. / ' " . • • 
/ 
R. L. Tucket t , Jus t i ce 
47~Chournos v. Evona Investment Co. , 97 Utah 335, 93 P . 2d 450 (1939). 
5. P r o u t v. Roby, 82 U. S. (15 Wall) 471 (1872); and s e e , general ly , 10 A. L. R. 
'2d 884, Annot. - - Tenant ' s Option to P u r c h a s e . 
6. Penn Star Mining Co. v. Lyman, 64 Utah 343, 231 P . 107 (1924); Ewell & 
Son Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp . , 27 Utah 2d 198, 493 P . 2d 1283. 
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MAUGHAN, Justice: (Dissenting) 
Dissent. 
Given the language of Paragraph VI of the lease , that the $2, 000 cash 
was a further consideration for the option, and in addition to the other cove-
nants, I am of the opinion that the covenant controlling the option was independ-
ent; and thus not dependent upon the subsistence of the lease . 
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APPENDIX B 
NOTE- THIS I S PAGE 5 , OF THE LEASE AND PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
DATED MARCH 3 1 , 1 9 6 7 , [ EXHIBIT 11 ] . 
include the value of any improvements placed on or within sa id 
property by Lessee. The oxpenso of said appraisal to be paid by 
tho party employing the appraiser. 
~&F .^TT^ -&££ 
\r- Lassee - f i wn u.xd &r (j uv A*VJ&*!33fto day uf itwembsr, ^EJ~has 
or no'** 
the i2s^w^eca^ifc^4^^> to purchase a l l or a portion of the subject 
property not theretofore purchased by Lessee from Lessors at i t s 
appraised value and terms as immediately above s e t f o r t h , sa£d 
rigfefet^-o^-puafrchase to^iH-tmaixr-jn-e^ei^rem 
^f klil flflTffinio, ^ r r*e 7 ^ ^ / ^ 7 / ^ / Q /c r^<^ so ye*<. l-Z^s^ 
AA ^ 7 / o-rn cesser w<-*~ 'vorsr-y 6c-sro^s /*/ rt<Ztr/Vt o/= 
foj~ T6**,"*"" », " 7 y rJXK.,rmtl 3 d PA/r „,.* re r*««L~*'»H 
^ TftGfA /AT&W'0" ?c ^ X £ ©/=• ^ s c . 
No default of Lessee in any of the provisions hereof 
shall constitute a basis for forfeiture of this lease unless the 
a = same shall continue for more than forty-five (k5) days after 
0
 t I O 
written notice to Lessee specifying of what tho default consists, 
and in the event Lessee fails to correct said default within such 
further time as is reasonably necessary to cure the same. Lessee 
shall quit and surrender the premises to Lessors subject to the 
reservation contained in paragraph II above* Because of the 
difficulties in ascertaining the damages that would thus be sus-
tained, if any, by Lessors, it is agreed that Lessee shall pay 
to Lessors the sum of $2,500 as exclusive, fixed and liquidated 
damages. 
Any and all agreements, covenants and conditions herein-
before stipulated shall apply to, benefit and bind the heirs, 
successors, executors, administrators and assigns of the respective 
parties hereto* 
£N WITNESS /tfHERSOF, fcfie parti^ to ^fchis Agreement have 
o < a 3 
£ • * > 
Z. & z C 
* z i 5 




 _A^Russ$ll ~ ^ , ' - . , , . 0 ' •••:// X • 24artelle Russe l l ' 
R o b e r t V O ^ a j o r , P r a ^ e n t j b f ^ < •>. : - ; B O O K M i l f ^ G f 3 S J 
THE WAJDfl^A'KENEY-XIN^^TtflAI" $h"Hl 
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